This paper studies nepotism as tool for rent-extraction and for the exchange of political favors. We do so in the context of Brazilian municipalities using detailed population data on family links, electoral candidates and employment. First, using a RD design based on close elections, we document that the election of mayors and councilors significantly improves their relatives’ employment outcomes. This effect is explained by the take up of public jobs and drives the selection of less skilled individuals into the public sector. Second, we provide evidence consistent with the idea that mayors allocate public jobs to the relatives of opposition councilors in exchange for their political support.
Information on participating / attending:
Free of Charge
Date:
09/25/2025 14:00 - 09/25/2025 15:15
Event venue:
ROCKWOOL Foundation Berlin
Gormannstrasse No. 22
10119 Berlin
Berlin
Germany
Target group:
Scientists and scholars, all interested persons
Email address:
Relevance:
international
Subject areas:
Economics / business administration, Politics
Types of events:
Seminar / workshop / discussion
Entry:
09/15/2025
Sender/author:
Harald Schultz
Department:
Kommunikation
Event is free:
no
Language of the text:
English
URL of this event: http://idw-online.de/en/event80028
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