idw – Informationsdienst Wissenschaft

Nachrichten, Termine, Experten

Grafik: idw-Logo
Science Video Project
idw-Abo

idw-News App:

AppStore

Google Play Store



Instance:
Share on: 
09/11/2024 13:27

Germany is rearming too slowly to stand up to Russia

Mathias Rauck Kommunikation
Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft

    After decades of military downsizing, German military spending is woefully inadequate to meet the new strategic challenge posed by Russia—as both a new report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and the new Kiel Military Procurement Tracker show. In combination with a cumbersome national procurement system and depending on weapon systems it would take Germany as much as a century to bring its military inventory up to the level of 20 years ago. In contrast, Russia is radically increasing its capacity to produce armaments, including advanced systems, and is now in a position to produce as many weapons in six months as all of Germany’s armed forces currently field.

    “Russia is becoming an ever greater security threat to NATO,” says Guntram Wolff, Fellow at the Kiel Institute and lead author of the report “Fit for war in decades: Europe's and Germany’s slow rearmament vis-à-vis Russia” (https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/fit-for-war-in-decades-europes-and-germanys...).

    “At the same time, we in Germany are making slow progress in committing to rearmament needed for deterrence. What Europe needs now is a permanent, substantial, and immediate increase in Germany’s regular defense spending to at least 2 percent of GDP, in addition to the special fund. Let's be clear—any ‘business as usual’ approach would be negligent and irresponsible in the face of Russian aggression.”

    The German government is currently barely managing to replace the weapons it is sending to Ukraine–the Bundeswehr's stockpile of air defense systems and howitzers has even plummeted. It was not until 2023, a good year after Russia attacked Ukraine, that Germany began to raise regular defense spending in any significant way, finally pushing annual spending above the NATO target of 2 percent of GDP. The coalition has since awarded military contracts worth some 90 billion euros (the Kiel Military Procurement Tracker/https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/kiel-military-procurement-tracker-33232/?AD... documents all German defense purchases announced since 2020).

    But Wolff and his co-authors criticize the government’s military spending goals for not being ambitious enough. They estimate it would currently take Germany nearly a hundred years to restore the Bundeswehr's military capacity to 2004 levels—the result of drastic downsizing by successive preceding governments and overly slow and modest rearmament by the current administration.

    At current rates of procurement, Germany would re-establish its 2004 capabilities in combat aircraft in about 15 years, in tanks in roughly 40 years—and in howitzers in only about one hundred years.

    Russia's fighting power is increasing steadily

    At the same time, the Kiel Institute report notes, Russia would be able to supply a similar volume of weapons in a much shorter time. The country's manufacturing capacity has grown to the point where it can produce the equivalent of the Bundeswehr's entire arsenal in just over half a year. Since the attack on Ukraine, Russia has significantly increased its capacity to produce key weapons systems—by a factor of two for long-range air defense systems, for example, and by a factor of three for tanks.

    Thanks to support from North Korea, Russia can currently expend around 10,000 rounds of ammunition (shells and rockets) per day with no fear of depleting its stockpiles. At a similar rate of fire, Germany would use up a year’s worth of its entire ammunition production within 70 days.

    The authors also note that Russia has made great strides in modern combat systems. Its capacity to produce unmanned drones has increased more than sixfold, and its expertise in and arsenal of supersonic and hypersonic missiles—highly destructive and hard to intercept—pose a major risk to NATO.

    A ceasefire in Ukraine would allow Russia to replenish its military stocks at an unprecedented rate.

    Lack of incentives for defense industry

    The authors are particularly critical of German budget planning, noting it does not provide sufficient long-term clarity for the defense industry to expand production capacity as it´s not clear how much money the government will be willing and able to spend once its 100-billion-euro special defense fund is exhausted. This has also led to long delivery times and high manufacturing costs. “Long-term planning and an efficient procurement system are essential to build industrial capacity,” says Wolff.

    Military procurement is also unnecessarily expensive because order volumes are relatively small and unit prices higher than for larger orders, says the report. Germany is preferring to do business mainly with domestic producers, regardless of the costs. The authors recommend more joint European defense procurement as a more efficient alternative.

    Moritz Schularick, President of the Kiel Institute, says: “The ‘Zeitenwende’, or epochal shift, in military spending promised by the German government in 2022 has so far proved to be empty rhetoric. Peace will come when the regime in Moscow understands that it cannot win wars of aggression in Europe militarily. For this, Germany and Europe need credible military capabilities. Germany must have an adequate annual defense budget to at least 100 billion euros per year.”

    The report makes six concrete policy recommendations and calls for a coordinated European armaments strategy.

    Read the Kiel Report here: “Fit for war in decades: Europe's and Germany’s slow rearmament vis-à-vis Russia”/https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/fit-for-war-in-decades-europes-and-germanys...

    Discover the database here: Kiel Military Procurement Tracker/https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/kiel-military-procurement-tracker-33232/?AD...

    Media Contact:
    Mathias Rauck
    Press Officer
    T +49 431 8814-411
    mathias.rauck@ifw-kiel.de

    Kiel Institute for the World Economy
    Kiellinie 66 | 24105 Kiel | Germany
    Chausseestraße 111 | 10115 Berlin | Germany
    T +49 431 8814-1
    E info@ifw-kiel.de
    www.ifw-kiel.de


    Contact for scientific information:

    Prof. Dr. Guntram Wolff
    Visiting Scholar
    T +49 151 59905505
    guntram.wolff@bruegel.org


    Images

    Major weapon types: theoretical year of replenishment of 2004 stocks in Germany
    Major weapon types: theoretical year of replenishment of 2004 stocks in Germany

    Kiel Institute, Source: Kiel Report Wolff et al.


    Criteria of this press release:
    Business and commerce, Journalists, Scientists and scholars
    Economics / business administration, Politics, Social studies
    transregional, national
    Transfer of Science or Research
    English


     

    Major weapon types: theoretical year of replenishment of 2004 stocks in Germany


    For download

    x

    Help

    Search / advanced search of the idw archives
    Combination of search terms

    You can combine search terms with and, or and/or not, e.g. Philo not logy.

    Brackets

    You can use brackets to separate combinations from each other, e.g. (Philo not logy) or (Psycho and logy).

    Phrases

    Coherent groups of words will be located as complete phrases if you put them into quotation marks, e.g. “Federal Republic of Germany”.

    Selection criteria

    You can also use the advanced search without entering search terms. It will then follow the criteria you have selected (e.g. country or subject area).

    If you have not selected any criteria in a given category, the entire category will be searched (e.g. all subject areas or all countries).