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Darmstadt, February 9, 2022. In an international research project, scientists at the System Security Lab of TU Darmstadt and Zhejiang University in Hangzhou managed, for the first time, to perform targeted attacks on capacitive touchscreens. Using the so-called “GhostTouch”, the researchers were able to use electromagnetic interference (EMI) to simulate touches on the display and thus remotely control the smartphone. In three different attack scenarios, nine out of the twelve smartphone models tested could be manipulated.
To realize the attack, the research team had to solve two main technical challenges: First, the difficulty of affecting the touchscreen at all through electromagnetic interference, and second, creating predictable and controllable touches. “In our attacks, we varied the power of the EMI transmitting antenna, the signal frequency, and the distance from the phone display to trigger touches such as taps or swipes with the appropriate signal strength,” explains Richard Mitev, a PhD student at the System Security Lab.
In order to achieve simultaneous controlled touches, the scientists examined the screens of the tested smartphone models in detail in advance. Each device model is based on specific movement patterns for actions such as unlocking, selecting or scrolling. By precisely tuning the parameters of the electromagnetic signal, it was possible to simulate these movement patterns with specifically positioned touches.
Using the “GhostTouch” and the touches it faked, the following threats could be turned into reality in practical attack scenarios, such as the injection of malware: If attackers knows the phone number of the victim, they can send a message containing a malicious link, for example. If the phone displays a notification for the received message, the attacker can open the notification using the “GhostTouch” and click on the link to download, for example, the malware that is embedded in the link.
In addition, the attacker can establish a sneaky connection via WiFi or Bluetooth. For example, he can control the phone with a Bluetooth mouse or perform a man-in-the-middle attack, which can be used to capture communications. In the third scenario, the attacker accepts a call via “GhostTouch” so that an eavesdropping attack can be launched and the victim can be bugged.
Although modern screens are subjected to careful electromagnetic tests and feature a protective anti-interference design, it was possible to generate targeted, contactless touches on nine of the twelve smartphone models tested and thus implement attacks. This demonstrates that the functionality of even the most modern touchscreens can be manipulated under certain conditions using the right equipment, and that they should not be blindly trusted.
The research results will be presented at this year's USENIX Security Conference between August 10 and 12 in Boston.
About TU Darmstadt:
TU Darmstadt is one of Germany’s leading technical universities and a synonym for excellent, relevant research. We are crucially shaping global transformations – from the energy transition via Industry 4.0 to artificial intelligence – with outstanding insights and forward-looking study opportunities. TU Darmstadt pools its cutting-edge research in three fields: Energy and Environment, Information and Intelligence, Matter and Materials. Our problem-based interdisciplinarity as well as our productive interaction with society, business and politics generate progress towards sustainable development worldwide. Since we were founded in 1877, we have been one of Germany’s most international universities; as a European technical university, we are developing a trans-European campus in the network, Unite! With our partners in the alliance of Rhine-Main universities – Goethe University Frankfurt and Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz – we further the development of the metropolitan region Frankfurt-Rhine-Main as a globally attractive science location.
MI-Nr. 08e/2022, Fröhlich/sip
Prof. Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi,
Head of System Security Lab, TU Darmstadt
E-Mail: ahmad.sadeghi@trust.tu-darmstadt.de
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec22summer_wang-kai.pdf
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